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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULING VIOLATES MR. JAWAD’S
RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR TORTURE AND
SHOULD BE REVERSED.
The right to a remedy for violations of human rights is a bedrock principle of
international human rights law. It is protected by every major international human
rights instrument.1 It is universally recognized by international and regional human
rights tribunals.2 And it is an established principle of customary international law.3
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See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, Dec. 10, 1948
(“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3), Dec. 16, 1966
(“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes [t]o ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting
in an official capacity.”) (hereinafter “ICCPR”); the European Convention on
Human Rights (formerly the “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms”) art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950 (“Everyone whose rights and
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
by persons acting in an official capacity”); the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights arts. 7(1) and 26, Oct. 21, 1986 (“Every individual shall have the
right to have his cause heard,” and “State parties . . . shall have the duty to
guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and
improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and
protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter”);
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. XVIII, May 2, 1948
(“Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There
should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts
will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any
fundamental constitutional rights.”) (hereinafter “American Declaration”);
American Convention on Human Rights art. 25, Nov. 20, 1969 (“Everyone has the
right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent
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Moreover, the right to a remedy is robust. It includes a right to an
appropriate remedy.4 It includes a right to an effective remedy.5 It includes a right
to a judicial or judicially enforced remedy.6 And it includes a right to a remedy
against the state, or the responsible individual, or both.7 Importantly, the right to a
remedy is absolute, categorical, and non-derogable.8

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this
Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons
acting in the course of their official duties.”) (hereinafter “American Convention”);
Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 23, May 22, 2004 (“Each State party to the
present Charter undertakes to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”).
2
See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004); Cordova v. Italy (No. 1), App. No.
40877/98, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 974, 984 (2003); Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, ¶ 25 (July
21, 1989).
3
United Nations General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 2005) (adopted by
consensus, including by the United States) (hereinafter “Basic Principles”).
4
See, e.g., Basic Principles ¶¶ 11 and 18 (stating that the right to a remedy
includes a right to access to justice; reparations, including restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition; and
relevant information).
5
See, e.g., id. ¶ 11 (“Remedies . . . include . . . [a]dequate, effective and
prompt reparation for harm suffered.”)
6
See, e.g., id. ¶ 12 (“A victim . . . shall have equal access to an effective
judicial remedy . . . .”).
7
See, e.g., id. ¶ 15 (“In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is
found liable for reparation to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the
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The U.S. is bound to honor the right to a remedy under the Convention
Against Torture, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The right applies through
these instruments to the actions of the U.S. government and its officers and agents
wherever they operate, including at the detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base. In particular, the right applies to victims of torture at Guantanamo
Bay. It means that the U.S. must provide an effective judicial remedy for
Mohammed Jawad.
Yet the United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected Mr.
Jawad’s claims and dismissed his complaint. Jawad v. Gates, 2015 WL 4113336
(D.D.C. 2015). The court rejected every legislative remedy that is available to Mr.
Jawad, and it declined to extend a judicial remedy. Id. The district court’s action
thus left Mr. Jawad entirely without a remedy and so violates Mr. Jawad’s
international right to an effective judicial remedy for torture.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

victim or compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the
victim.”).
8
See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 ¶ 14 (Aug. 31, 2001) (“Even if a State party, during a
state of emergency . . . may introduce adjustments to the practical functioning of its
procedures governing judicial or other remedies, the State party must comply with
the fundamental obligation . . . of the Covenant to provide a remedy that is
effective.”).	
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I.

The U.S. Must Provide a Judicial Remedy for Victims of Torture Under
International Human Rights Law.
A.

The Convention Against Torture Requires the United States to
Provide a Judicial Remedy for Victims of Torture.

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (the “CAT”), which the U.S. ratified on October 21,
1994, categorically bans torture at Guantanamo Bay. It also requires the U.S. to
provide an effective judicial remedy for victims of torture.
1.

The CAT Applies to U.S. Acts at Guantanamo Bay.

By its plain terms, the CAT requires the United States to ban torture
categorically in any location under its jurisdiction. Article 2 of the CAT provides:
1.
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction.
2.
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of
war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
CAT art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (emphasis added). The
Committee Against Torture, which implements the CAT, clarified the scope of its
application and wrote that “any territory under its jurisdiction” really sweeps as
broadly as that phrase suggests:
The Committee has recognized that “any territory” includes all areas
where the State party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in
part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with
international law. The reference to “any territory” . . . refers to
prohibited acts committed not only on board a ship or aircraft
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registered by a State party, but also during military occupation or
peacekeeping operations and in such places as embassies, military
bases, detention facilities, or other areas over which a State exercises
factual or effective control. . . . The Committee considers that the
scope of “territory” under article 2 must also include situations where
a State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure
control over persons in detention.
Committee Against Torture General Comment 2, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 ¶
16 (Jan. 24, 2008). See also id. ¶ 7.
The United States recognized this broad scope on the prohibition against
torture and on a victim’s right to a remedy when it ratified the CAT. Upon
ratification, the United Sates included this reservation, echoing the Committee’s
General Comment 2:
That it is the understanding of the United States that article 14
requires a State Party to provide a private right of action for damages
only for acts of torture committed in territory under the jurisdiction of
that State Party.
Sen. Exec. Rpt. 101-30, Resolution on Advice and Consent to Ratification §
II.3. (1990) (emphasis added). President Obama reiterated that domestic bans on
torture apply to “the treatment and interrogation of individuals detained in any
armed conflict . . . whenever such individuals are in the custody or under the
effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States
Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a
department or agency of the United States.” Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, Exec.
Order No. 13,491 (January 22, 2009). And more recently the U.S. reaffirmed its
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commitment to apply the categorical ban on torture in the CAT to “any territory
under its jurisdiction” and to any acts of any government agency or official. In its
periodical report to the CAT Committee, the U.S. repeatedly acknowledged that
the CAT applies at Guantanamo Bay. The U.S. wrote:
Under U.S. law, officials of all government agencies are prohibited
from engaging in torture, at all times, and in all places, not only in
territory under U.S. jurisdiction. Under the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 . . . every U.S. official, wherever he or she may be, is also
prohibited from engaging in acts that constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. This prohibition is enforced at all
levels of U.S. government.
Committee against Torture, United Sates of America Periodic Report, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/USA/3-5 ¶ 13 (Dec. 4, 2013). See also id. ¶¶ 36, 39, 105 (“The
prohibition on torture under U.S. law is absolute and, as provided in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, no individual in the custody or under the physical control
of the U.S. government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be
subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”) (emphasis
added).
The CAT Committee validated this acknowledgment by “welcom[ing] the
State party’s unequivocal commitment to abide by the universal prohibition of
torture and ill-treatment everywhere, including Bagram and Guantanamo Bay
detention facilities, as well as the assurances that the United States personnel are
legally prohibited under international and domestic law from engaging in torture or
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cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment at all times and in all
places.” Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined
third to fifth periodic reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 ¶ 10 (Dec. 19, 2014).
Because the CAT’s categorical ban on torture applies at Guantanamo Bay
and Bagram, then so too does its right to a judicial remedy.
2.

The CAT Includes an Effective Right to a Judicial Remedy for
Victims of Torture.

The plain language of the CAT requires the U.S. to provide an effective
judicial remedy for victims of torture, including prompt, fair, and adequate
compensation for acts of torture. This includes an obligation to enact legislation
that provides a victim of torture with an effective remedy, including full restitution
and compensation, enforceable through the courts. And when legislation proves
ineffective at providing a remedy, the U.S. nevertheless must provide an effective
judicial remedy for victims of torture.
Article 14 of the CAT provides:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an
act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation
as possible. . . .
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CAT art. 14 (emphasis added). This right to an effective judicial remedy includes
full restitution and compensation, and more. The CAT Committee clarified the
scope of Article 14 in its General Comment 3:
As stated in paragraph 2 above, redress includes the following five
forms of reparation: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. The Committee
recognizes the elements of full redress under international law and
practice as outlined in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles and Guidelines).
Reparation must be adequate, effective and comprehensive. State
parties are reminded that in the determination of redress and
reparative measures provided or awarded to a victim of torture or illtreatment, the specificities and circumstances of each case must be
taken into consideration and redress should be tailored to the
particular needs of the victim and be proportionate to the gravity of
the violations committed against them. The Committee emphasizes
that the provision of reparation has an inherent preventive and
deterrent effect in relation to future violations.
Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 ¶ 6
(Dec. 13, 2012). See also id. ¶ 8 (“Restitution is a form of redress designed to reestablish the victim’s situation before the violation of the Convention was
committed, taking into consideration the specificities of each case.”); id. ¶ 9 (“The
Committee emphasizes that monetary compensation alone may not be sufficient
redress for a victim of torture and ill-treatment. The Committee affirms that the
provision of monetary compensation only is inadequate for a State party to comply
with its obligations under article 14.”); id. ¶ 10 (describing the full scope of
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“prompt, fair and adequate compensation for torture of ill-treatment under article
14”).
In order to comply with Article 14, state parties have an obligation to enact
domestic legislation to enforce and to provide an effective remedy to victims of
torture. Id. ¶ 20 (“To give effect to article 14, States parties shall enact legislation
specifically providing a victim of torture and ill-treatment with an effective remedy
and the right to obtain adequate and appropriate redress, including compensation
and as full rehabilitation as possible.”) Moreover, state parties must provide for the
enforcement of this domestic legislation through the courts. Id. (“Such legislation
must allow for individuals to exercise this right and ensure their access to a judicial
remedy. While collective reparation and administrative reparation programmes
may be acceptable as a form of redress, such programmes may not render
ineffective the individual right to a remedy and to obtain redress.”).
When domestic legislation fails to provide an effective remedy, the CAT
nevertheless requires state parties to provide an effective remedy through the
judiciary. Indeed, the CAT Committee specifically identified “inadequate national
legislation” as an obstacle to the full realization of the right to an effective remedy:
States parties to the Convention have an obligation to ensure that the
right to redress is effective. Specific obstacles that impede the
enjoyment of the right to redress and prevent effective implementation
of article 14 include, but are not limited to: inadequate national
legislation . . . state secrecy laws, evidential burdens and procedural
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requirements that interfere with the determination of the right to
redress; statutes of limitations, amnesties and immunities . . . .
Id. ¶ 38. See also id. ¶ 32 (“The principle of non-discrimination is a basic and
general principle in the protection of human rights and fundamental to the
interpretation and application of the Convention. States parties shall ensure that
access to justice and to mechanisms for seeking and obtaining redress are readily
available and that positive measures ensure that redress is equally accessible to all
persons regardless of . . . reason for which the person is detained, including
persons accused of political offences or terrorist acts . . . .”). In other words, a
torture victim’s right to an effective remedy exists with or without national
legislation; and when national legislation is ineffective, the CAT nevertheless
requires the courts to provide a remedy.
The CAT Committee specifically recognized that the obligations under
Article 14 applied to U.S. torture overseas. Thus, for example, the CAT Committee
urged the United States to “[p]rovide effective remedies and redress to victims,
including fair and adequate compensation, and as full rehabilitation as possible, in
accordance with the Committee’s general comment No. 3 (2012) on the
implementation of article 14 of the Convention by State parties.” Committee
against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined third to fifth periodic
reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 ¶ 12(c)
(Dec. 19, 2014). It also urged the U.S. to “[e]nsure . . . that effective reparation,
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including adequate compensation, is granted to every victim . . . .” and to “ensure
effective redress” for victims of detainee abuse, including torture, at Guantanamo
Bay and Bagram. Id. ¶ 14(c). And “[t]he State party should ensure that all victims
of torture are able to access a remedy and obtain redress, wherever acts of torture
have occurred, and regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”
Id. ¶ 15.
Finally, the CAT Committee wrote,
The Committee urges the State party to take immediate legal and
other measures to ensure that all victims of torture and ill-treatment
obtain redress and have an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation . . . in particular . . . terror suspects claiming abuse . . . .
The Committee draws the State party’s attention to its general
comment No. 3 (2012) on the implementation of article 14 by State
parties, in particular paragraphs 3, 4, 11-15, 19, 32, and 39, in which it
elaborates on the nature and scope of State parties’ obligations to
provide full redress . . . .”
Id. ¶ 29.
In conclusion, Article 14 requires the U.S. to provide an effective judicial
remedy for victims of torture, including prompt, fair, and adequate compensation
for acts of torture. This means that the U.S. must enact legislation that provides a
victim of torture with an effective remedy, including full restitution and
compensation, enforceable through the courts. But if that legislation proves
ineffective, the U.S. nevertheless must provide an effective judicial remedy for
victims of torture.
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B.

The ICCPR Requires the United States to Provide an Effective
Judicial Remedy for Victims of Torture.

Like the CAT, the ICCPR requires the U.S. to provide an effective judicial
remedy for victims of torture. The U.S. ratified the ICCPR on June 8, 1992,
including its provisions that ban torture and that require state parties to provide an
effective judicial remedy for victims of torture and other rights within the
Covenant. (The U.S. included no reservations to the ban on torture or the right to a
remedy that are relevant here when it ratified the ICCPR.) Like the CAT, the
ICCPR requires the U.S. to provide an effective judicial remedy for victims of
torture, if legislative or administrative remedies do not exist.
The plain text of the ICCPR prohibits “torture [and] cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.” ICCPR art. 7. This ban on torture is
categorical and non-derogable. ICCPR art. 4(2). The U.S. has acknowledged its
obligation to prohibit torture under this provision, including torture at Guantanamo
Bay. Human Rights Committee, Fourth periodic report of the United States of
America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/4 ¶ 171 (May 22, 2012) (“In addition to U.S.
obligations under the ICCPR, torture is absolutely prohibited by the [CAT], by
customary international law, and by U.S. domestic law, which prohibits acts of
torture both inside and outside the United States . . . .”).
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In order to enforce the ban on torture, the ICCPR provides a right to an
effective remedy for victims of torture. Article 2(3) of the ICCPR states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.
ICCPR art. 2(3) (emphasis added). See also id. art. 9(5) (“Anyone who has been
the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.”). This means that a state party must provide a victim of torture an
“accessible, effective, and enforceable” remedy. Human Rights Committee
Communication No. 2018/2010, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2018/2012 ¶¶ 11.3,
11.6, 13 (Jan. 25, 2015) (stating that Article 2(3) requires “full reparation and
appropriate measures of satisfaction” for violations and concluding that Nepal
failed to provide an “adequate remedy” when it provided only modest interim
compensation for torture and extrajudicial killing).
If the “administrative or legislative authorities,” or any other authority of the
state, does not or cannot provide a remedy, then it falls upon the judiciary to do so.
See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, U.N. Doc.
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CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 ¶ 4 (Mar. 29, 2004) (stating that the obligations under
the ICCPR “are binding on every State Party as a whole,” and that “[a]ll branches
of government (executive, legislative and judicial), and other public or
governmental authorities, at whatever level—national, regional or local—are in a
position to engage the responsibility of the State Party.”). The rights in the ICCPR
“can be effectively assured by the judiciary in many different ways, including
direct applicability of the [ICCPR], application of comparable constitutional or
other provisions of law, or the interpretive effect of the [ICCPR] in the application
of national law.” Id. ¶ 15. But “[w]itout reparation to individuals whose Covenant
rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy, which is
central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged.” Id. ¶ 16. In
particular, domestic law, including domestic constitutional law, cannot “justify a
failure to perform or to give effect to obligations under the [ICCPR],” id ¶ 4, or to
absolve officials of responsibility for violations. Id. ¶ 18 (stating that “the States
Parties concerned may not relieve perpetrators from personal responsibility, as has
occurred with certain amnesties . . . and prior legal immunities and indemnities”
and that “no official status justifies persons who may be accused of responsibility
for such violations being held immune from legal responsibility.”).
The right to a remedy in the ICCPR applies even when a state party had no
direct involvement in the underlying violation, so long as it failed to determine
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whether there was a “substantial risk” of a violation. Thus, the Committee wrote in
Mansour Ahani v. Canada:
In light of the circumstances of the case, the State party, having failed
to determine appropriately whether a substantial risk of torture existed
such as to foreclose the author’s deportation, is under an obligation (a)
to make reparation to the author if it comes to light that torture was in
fact suffered subsequent to deportation, and (b) to take such steps as
may be appropriate to ensure that the author is not, in the future,
subjected to torture as a result of the events of his presence in, and
removal from, the State party.
Human Rights Committee, Mansour Ahani v. Canada, Communication No.
1051/2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 ¶ 12 (2004).
The Human Rights Committee concluded that the right to a remedy in the
ICCPR applies to victims of torture at Guantanamo Bay. In its most recent
Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the United States of
America, the Committee expressed concern about accountability for past human
rights violations, including “the use of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment of detainees in United States custody, including outside
its territory, as part of the so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’.” Human
Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the
United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 ¶ 5 (Apr. 23, 2014). The
Committee concluded that “[t]he State party should ensure that all cases of . . .
torture or other ill-treatment, unlawful detention or enforced disappearances . . . are
effectively, independently and impartially investigated . . . and that victims are
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provided with effective remedies.” Id. See also Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 20, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 ¶ 14 (1994) (stating that “[t]he
right to lodge complaints against maltreatment prohibited by article 7 [the ban on
torture] must be recognized in domestic law.”).
The Committee also expressed concern about barriers to the full realization
of the right to a remedy, especially barriers related to constitutional privileges that
would shield the government from accountability in the courts and immunities that
would shield individual officials from liability. Thus, the Committee expressed
concern “about the inability of torture victims to claim compensation from the
State party and its officials due to the application of broad doctrines of legal
privileges and immunity.” Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on
the fourth periodic report of the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 ¶ 12 (Apr. 23, 2014). The Committee concluded that “[t]he
State party should ensure the availability of compensation to victims of torture.”
Id.
In conclusion, the U.S. has an obligation under the ICCPR to provide an
effective judicial remedy to victims of torture at Guantanamo Bay. If a legislative
remedy does not exist or is unavailable, the courts have an obligation to provide a
remedy.
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C.

The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Requires
the United States to Provide an Effective Judicial Remedy for Victims
of Torture.

Like the CAT and the ICCPR, the American Declaration, too, requires the
U.S. to provide an effective judicial remedy for victims of torture.
The U.S. has been a member of the Organization of American States since
1951, when it deposited the instrument of ratification of the OAS Charter. The U.S.
is therefore subject to the obligations in the American Declaration. See
Interpretation of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 35-45 (ser. A) No. 10 (July 14, 1989)
(“According to the well-established and long-standing jurisprudence and practice
of the inter-American system, however, the American Declaration is recognized as
constituting a source of legal obligation for OAS member states, including in
particular those States that are not parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights.”). See also Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 80/11 ¶¶ 115 and 117 (July 21, 2011).
The American Declaration bans torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment at Guantanamo Bay. American Declaration, Articles I and XXV. See
also Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Toward the Closure of Guantanamo,
OAS/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 20/15 ¶¶ 120-136 (June 3, 2015) (stating that the conditions
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at Guantanamo Bay constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in violation
of the American Declaration). And like the CAT and the ICCPR, the American
Declaration provides a right to an effective judicial remedy for this torture. Article
XVIII of the American Declaration provides:
Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal
rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief
procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority
that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.
American Declaration art. XVIII. See also American Declaration art. XXIV
(“Every person has the right to submit respectful petitions to any competent
authority, for reasons of either general or private interest, and the right to obtain a
prompt decision thereon.”). This right is similar in scope to the right in Article 25
of the American Convention on Human Rights, which says,
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection
against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the
constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even
though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in
the course of their official duties.
American Convention art. 25. See also Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v.
United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 80/11 ¶¶
171 and 172 (July 21, 2011).
This right includes the right of a victim to go to a tribunal when his or
her rights have been violated, and the corresponding right to obtain
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reparations for the harm suffered. Id. See also Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, ¶ 25
(July 21, 1989) (“[E]very violation of an international obligation which
results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation.”); Raquel Marti
de Mejia v. Peru, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 5/96,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7 ¶ 157 (March 1, 1996) (The right to a remedy
“must be understood as the right of every individual to go to a tribunal when
any of his rights have been violated (whether a right protected by the
Convention, the constitution or the domestic laws of the State concerned), to
obtain a judicial investigation conducted by a competent, impartial and
independent tribunal that will establish whether or not a violation has taken
place and will set, when appropriate, adequate compensation.”).
The right to a remedy must be “available and effective,” which means,
among other things, that the U.S. must hold the responsible individuals to account.
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R. Report No. 80/11 ¶ 173 (July 21, 2011). See also Inter-Am. Comm’n on
Human Rights, Toward the Closure of Guantanamo, OAS/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 20/15
¶¶ 158 (June 3, 2015) (“The State’s duty to provide effective judicial remedies is
not served merely by their formal existence; that recourse must also be adequate
and effective in remedying the human rights violations denounced.”). The remedy
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must also be “suitable,” that is, appropriate to the violation. Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 64 (July 29,
1988) (“Adequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an
infringement of a legal right. A number of remedies exist in the legal system of
every country, but not all are applicable in every circumstance.”). “[T]he absence
of an effective remedy to violations of the rights recognized by the Convention is
itself a violation of the Convention by the State Party in which the remedy is
lacking.” Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, ¶ 24 (Oct. 6, 1987).
The Inter-American Commission could not be clearer that the right to an
effective judicial remedy in the American Declaration applies to victims of torture
at Guantanamo Bay. In its Guantanamo Report, the Commission wrote,
The IACHR also reminds the United States that the right to reparation
for victims of torture is a well-established principle of international
law and, according to the ICRC, a rule that is applicable in any type of
armed conflict. . . . The IACHR reiterates the call to the United States
to provide integral reparations to the victims, including restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and measures of nonrepetition, pursuant to international standards.
Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Toward the Closure of Guantanamo,
OAS/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 20/15 ¶ 119 (June 3, 2015). This means that the U.S. must
provide an effective judicial remedy for victims of torture at Guantanamo Bay.
*

	
  

*

20

*

The U.S. has a legal obligation under the CAT, the ICCPR, and the
American Declaration to provide an effective judicial remedy to victims of torture
at Guantanamo Bay. This obligation is categorical and non-derogable. It means
that the U.S. must provide full reparations, including full compensation, to victims.
The remedy may be a creation of the legislative, executive, or judicial branch, but
if the legislature and executive fail to provide an effective remedy, the judiciary
must. In any event, whether the remedy is legislative, executive, or judicial, the
remedy must be enforceable through the courts.
This right to an effective judicial remedy under the CAT, the ICCPR, and
the American Declaration applies with full force to Mr. Jawad. Mr. Jawad has a
right to an effective judicial remedy for his torture at the hands of U.S. officials,
and the district court’s action dismissing his case violated that right.
II.

The District Court Violated Mr. Jawad’s Right to an Effective Judicial
Remedy.
Despite Mr. Jawad’s right to an effective judicial remedy for his torture

under three separate instruments, the district court rejected his claims and
dismissed his case. Jawad v. Gates, 2015 WL 4113336 (D.D.C. 2015). The district
court rejected Mr. Jawad’s statutory claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28
U.S.C. Sec. 2671 et seq., and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1350. Id. at *3 to *7. Then the district court rejected Mr. Jawad’s Fifth
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and Eighth Amendment claims by declining to apply a Bivens remedy. Id. at *7
(citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
By rejecting Mr. Jawad’s claims and dismissing his case, the district court
violated Mr. Jawad’s right to an effective judicial remedy for his torture under the
CAT, the ICCPR, and the American Declaration. Mr. Jawad’s right to an effective
judicial remedy in these instruments requires the courts to interpret statutes in
favor of an effective remedy for Mr. Jawad, when possible. See generally supra
Part I. And when the courts cannot interpret statutes in favor of an effective
remedy, the courts have an obligation under these instruments to provide one. Id.
By reading the statutes to deny a remedy, and by declining to provide a judicial
remedy, the district court violated Mr. Jawad’s right to an effective judicial
remedy.
First, the district court erred by holding that the Military Commissions Act
(“MCA”), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(e)(2), barred Mr. Jawad’s claims, despite his
minority at the time of his torture. Jawad, 2015 WL 4113336 at *8 - *9. The
obligations of the U.S. to provide an effective judicial remedy are heightened when
the victim is a minor. The CAT Committee described the heightened duty this way:
The Committee furthermore underlines the importance of appropriate
procedures being made available to address the needs of children,
taking into account the best interests of the child and the child’s right
to express his or her views freely in all matters affecting him or her,
including judicial and administrative proceedings, and of the views of
the child being given due weight in accordance with age and maturity
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of the child. States parties should ensure the availability of childsensitive measures for reparation which foster the health and dignity
of the child.
Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 ¶ 36
(Dec. 13, 2012). See also Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on
the combined third to fifth periodic reports of the United States of America, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 ¶ 29 (Dec. 19, 2014) (“The [CAT] Committee is further
concerned about the situation of certain individuals and groups who have been
made vulnerable by discrimination or marginalization and who face specific
obstacles that impede the enjoyment of their right to redress.”). Similarly, the
Human Rights Committee wrote: “Such remedies should be appropriately adapted
so as to take account of the special vulnerability of certain categories of persons,
including in particular children.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 ¶ 15 (Mar. 29, 2004). And with especial
attention to child-detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Inter-American Commission
wrote:
According to international law, children and adolescents who have
been recruited or used in armed conflicts are understood to be in a
special situation. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict, ratified by the United States in 2002, explicitly requires the
rehabilitation of former child soldiers, including “all appropriate
assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their
social reintegration.”
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Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Toward the Closure of Guantanamo,
OAS/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 20/15 ¶ 234 (June 3, 2015). Under this heightened duty to
provide an effective judicial remedy for victims who are minors, the district court
should have read the MCA differently, that is, not to bar a remedy for Mr. Jawad.
As Mr. Jawad argues in his principal brief, such a reading is not only possible, but
it is preferable to a reading that bars a remedy. Jawad Brief at 12-28. By declining
to read the MCA with an eye to Mr. Jawad’s age at the time of his torture—and by
reading the MCA to bar Mr. Jawad’s claims—the district court violated its
heightened duty to provide an effective judicial remedy.
Next, the district court erred by substituting the U.S. for the individual
defendants under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b)(1), at least insofar as
substitution then denied Mr. Jawad an effective remedy. Jawad, 2015 WL 4113336
at *3 - *5. The district court had an obligation to read the Westfall Act consistent
with its duty to provide Mr. Jawad with an effective remedy, that is, not to require
substitution, if substitution would then deny Mr. Jawad an effective remedy. (After
holding that the Westfall Act compelled substitution, the district court held that the
U.S. enjoyed sovereign immunity, and that it did not waive that immunity. Id. This
two-step deprived Mr. Jawad of available statutory remedies under the ATCA and
FTCA. The district court also erred in holding that the U.S. did not waive its
immunity under the FTCA, insofar as sovereign immunity would deny Mr. Jawad
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an effective remedy. Id.) As Mr. Jawad explains, a reading of the Westfall Act that
does not compel substitution squares better with his allegations, anyway. Jawad
Brief at 33-44. The district court erred by failing to read the Westfall Act
consistent with its duty to provide an effective remedy.
Third, the district court erred by holding that the TVPA failed to provide Mr.
Jawad with an effective remedy. Jawad, 2015 WL 4113336 at *7. The district
court held that the remedies in the TVPA applied only against “individuals acting
pursuant to the authority of a foreign nation.” But this reading by the district court,
along with its other holdings in the case, deprives Mr. Jawad of an effective
remedy for his torture. As Mr. Jawad argues in his principal brief, the district court
could have read the TVPA to create an effective remedy, not to deny one. Jawad
Brief at 53-56. That reading would be consistent with the court’s duty to provide
Mr. Jawad with an effective remedy. But by reading the TVPA to deny an effective
remedy, along with its other holdings in the case, the district court violated Mr.
Jawad’s right to an effective remedy.
Finally, the district court erred by declining to apply a Bivens remedy. The
district court held that “special factors counsel against the judiciary’s involvement
in the treatment of detainees held at Guantanamo.” Id. (quoting Al-Zahrani v.
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 111-12 (D.D.C. 2010)). But this holding, along
with the court’s other holdings in the case, deprives Mr. Jawad of an effective
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remedy for his torture. As Mr. Jawad explains in his principal brief, the district
court erred in ruling that special factors counseled against a Bivens remedy in this
case. Jawad Brief at 44-50. Mr. Jawad’s position squares with the district court’s
obligation to provide him with an effective judicial remedy. In particular, under the
right to an effective judicial remedy, when statutory remedies fail to provide an
effective remedy, the courts must provide one. In our system, that remedy is
Bivens. By failing to apply a Bivens remedy in this case, when all other remedies
failed, the district court violated Mr. Jawad’s right to an effective judicial remedy.
*

*

*

By rejecting Mr. Jawad’s claims and dismissing his case, the district court
violated Mr. Jawad’s right to an effective judicial remedy. First, the district court
violated its duty to read Mr. Jawad’s statutory claims in favor of a remedy. Next,
when the court concluded that Mr. Jawad’s statutory claims failed to provide a
remedy, the court violated its duty to apply a Bivens remedy. Taken as a whole, the
district court’s ruling denies Mr. Jawad an effective remedy and thus violates his
well-settled right to an effective judicial remedy under international human rights
law. The district court’s ruling should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
U.S. courts have an obligation under the CAT, the ICCPR, and the American
Declaration to interpret federal statutes to provide an effective remedy for Mr.
Jawad, or to apply a Bivens remedy, or both. Because the district court rejected Mr.
Jawad’s claims and failed to provide an effective remedy, the district court’s ruling
should be reversed.
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